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LoPucki: Statute of Limitations in Warranty

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN WARRANTY
LYNN M. LOPUCKI*

The necessity for having some limitation upon the time in which a
lawsuit must be brought has never been seriously questioned. Of course a
plaintiff should not be allowed to delay bringing suit until "memories have
faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost.' At
the same time one cannot help but sympathize with many of the victims
of the running of the limitations period- persons who have suffered some
legal wrong but have been denied compensation because their injuries were
slow to develop, because they chose not to sue until they were desperate,
because they or their attorney miscalculated, or because they were too "slow"
in discovering their cause of action.
2
But as one court put it:
[l]t was presumably pursuant to a determination that the interests
of an occasional claimant were subordinate to society's interest in
repose that resulted in the statute of limitations in the first place....
It is hard to say for certain but perhaps the possibility of feigned cases
against unprepared defendants and the difficulties of proof in meritorious cases led to a decision [by the legislature] that society is best
served by complete repose after a certain number of years even at the
sacrifice of a few unfortunate cases.
The purpose of this article is to explore society's interests in limiting
actions and some of those "unfortunate cases" to see if a better balance
could be struck between them in warranty cases. But first it is necessary to
determine what limitation period we are talking about.
WHAT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS Is
ACTION ARISING

APPLICABLE TO A PERSONAL INJURY

OUT OF A BREACH OF WARRANTY?

There is very little uniformity among the states regarding warranty
limitations periods. Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code,
and in those transactions to which the Code does not apply, the majority
of states applied or apply their general "personal injury" statute to personal
injuries arising out of breach of warranty. 3 These statutes range from one
-B.A. 1965, J.D. 1967, University of Michigan; Member of the Florida Bar; Assistant
Professor of Business Law, University of Florida.
1. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 804, 314 (1945).
2. Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 218-19, 188 N.E.2d 142.,
145, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, 718-19, 4 A.L.R.3d 814, 819 (1963).
3. E.g., Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 355 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1966)
applied a two-year statute covering injuries to personal property or to the person, rather
than the six-year contract limitation; Marsh v. Southern Airways, Inc., 316 F.2d 91 (5th

Cir. 1963) held a one-year limitation for personal injuries controlling rather than the sixyear contract statute; Repass v. Keleket X-Ray Corp., 212 F. Supp. 406 (D.N.J. 1962) held
that a two-year personal injury statute governed warranty action; Dawson v. Fernley &
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year in Alabama, California, Connecticut, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Tennessee to six years in Colorado, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and South Carolina with a considerable number
specifying a two-year period (Ohio, New Jersey, Hawaii, Illinois, Virginia,
Oregon, and Kansas). A few states, however, apply the contract rather than
the personal injury statute. 4 A third limitation period, occasionally applied,
is that for breach of a particular obligation arising from a statute. 5 Thus,
prior to the passage of the Code, the limitation period for a breach of
warranty ranged from one to six years.
The Code, now adopted in forty-nine states, specifies a four-year statute
of limitations for breach of warranty.6 A few states have rejected the fouryear period,7 and there has been some speculation that it does not apply to
personal injury actions,8 but generally the statute of limitations for personal
injuries arising out of breach of warranty in the sale of goods is now the
four-year period provided in Uniform Commercial Code, section 2-725 (1).9
Presently, the real controversy in this area is on another question of at least
equal importance.
Eger, 196 F. Supp. 816 (E.D. Va. 1961) applied a two-year personal injury limitation;
Rodibaugh v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 225 Cal. App. 2d 570, 37 Cal. Rptr. 646 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1964) applied a one-year personal injury statute; Patterson v. Vincent, 44 Del. 442, 61
A.2d 416 (1948) adopted a one-year personal injury statute; Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hosp., 427
P2d 845 (Hawaii 1967) applied a two-year personal injury statute to a malpractice action;
Seymour v. Union News Co., 349 IMI.App. 197, 110 N.E.2d 475 (1953) was decided under a
two-year personal injury statute; Baatz v. Smith, 361 Mich. 68, 104 N.W.2d 787 (1960)
applied a three-year personal injury statute to both contract and tort actions; Burns v.
Bethlehem Steel Co., 20 NJ. 37, 118 A.2d 544 (1955) applied a two-year personal injury
statute; Thigpen v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 11 Ohio App. 2d 179, 229 N.E.2d 107 (1967)
(dicta) applied a two-year personal injury statute; Hall v. De Saussure, 297 S.W.2d 81 (Tenn.
CL App. 1956), cert. denied, 297 S.W.2d 90 (Tenn. 1956) involved a one-year personal in-

jury statute.
4. Public Adm'r v. Curtis-Wright Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2386 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) applied the
three-year oral contract statute dictated by Fla. Stat. §95.11 (1961); Noel v. Proud, 189
Kan. 6, 367 P.2d 61 (1961) applied the oral contract statute to a warranty action; Wells v.
Oldsmobile Co., 147 Ore. 687, 35 P.2d 232 (1934) applied the six-year contract statute.
5. In Sincard v. Kremer, 133 Ohio St. 291, 13 N.E.2d 250 (1938), a case involving personal injury from broken glass in a bottle of milk, the Supreme Court of Ohio did not
apply its two-year personal injury statute but rather classified the action as one for the
sale of a dangerous substance and applied the six-year limitation period for a "liability
created by statute."

6.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§2-725 provides: "(1) An action for breach of any con-

tract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued ....
(2) A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made ....
"
7. Iowa omits the-first sentence of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-725 entirely
(IOWA CODE §554.2725 (1967)), Mississippi (Miss. CODE ANN. §41A:2-275 (Spec. UCC Supp.
1968)), South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. §10.2-725 (1967)), and Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN.
§402.725 (1967)) have changed the period to six years and Oklahoma has changed it to
five (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A §2-275 (1967)).
8. Broeker, Articles 2 and 6: Sales and Bulk Transfers, 15 U. Prrr. L. REv. 541, 551
(1954).
9. Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1965); Engleman v.
Eastern Light Co., Inc., 30 Pa. D. & C.2d 38 (County Ct. C.P. 1962), 1 UCC R.
SEmv. 187
(1965) citing UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §1-107. See also Cunningham, Confusion in the
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ACCRUE?

In a warranty action for personal injuries against a manufacturer, there
are several possibilities as to when the limitations period may commence:
the time when the product is manufactured, since that constitutes the wrongful act; the time when it was sold by the manufacturer, since that is when
the manufacturer breaches his contract; the time when it was sold by the
retailer, since that would be the first time plaintiff had any right to use it;
the time when the injury occurred; or the time when the injury was discovered. All but the first of these find some support in the decisions.
In Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co.10 the court was faced with the
question of when the Pennsylvania one-year personal injury statute began
to run in a negligence case. In holding that it ran from the time of the
injury the court commented that it was "[I]nconceivable that she should be
barred by lapse of time before the time when she could have instituted a
suit." ' While this argument has been widely accepted in negligence cases,
the majority view in warranty cases questions even this apparently obvious
conclusion. In Kakargo v. Grange Silo Co.12 plaintiff was killed in a fall
from a defective ladder on a silo. A wrongful death action was commenced
within three months of his fall. But the court ruled that New York's six-year
warranty statute had already run! The statute, the court said, ran from the
time defendant erected the silo seven years before the accident and thus had3
run a year before plaintiff's accident. There were numerous cases in accord .
In Ricciuti v. Voltarc Tubes, Inc.,' 4 for instance, it was held that a six-year
warranty statute ran from the time of the sale of defective beryllium tubes,
not from plaintiff's first disability from berylliosis some four years later.
Yet even when a court has concluded that the statute runs from the date
of the sale there still remains the question of which sale is intended, the
one from manufacturer to retailer or from retailer to consumer. If a warranty is given by the manufacturer of a product it would seem reasonable
to suppose that the warranty was part of his contract of sale to the retailer.
The contract would be breached on delivery to the retailer and the statute

Statutes of Limitation-A Collateral Consequence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 46
MAss. L.Q. 13 (1961).

10. 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949).
11. Id. at 38, 68 A.2d at 535; accord, City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1954).
12. 11 App. Div. 2d 796, 204 N.Y.S.2d 1010, motion for leave to appeal denied, 11 App.
Div. 2d 958, 207 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1960).
13. Berg v. Remington Arms Co., 207 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1962); L.E. Talcott & Sons,
Inc. v. Auroa Corp., 181 F. Supp. 581 (D. Del.), aff'd, 280 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1960); Gardiner
v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1965); E. 0. Painter Fertilizer Co.
v. Kil-Tone Co., 105 N.J.L. 109, 143 A. 332 (1928); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sheila-Lynn,
Inc., 185 Misc. 689, 57 N.Y.S.2d 707 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd, 270 App. Div. 835, 61 N.Y.S.2d
373, motion for leave to appeal denied, 270 App. Div. 893, 62 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1946); Rufo
v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 417 Pa. 107, 207 A.2d 823 (1965).
14. 277 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1960).
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would begin to run at that time.15 There are cases indicating this result.1 6
Other courts have approached this problem apparently with the assumption
that the relevant sale is the sale to the consumer,17 but fail to state any
theoretical basis for their assumption. Such a court might well argue that the
limitations period should not expire while the product is sitting on the
retailer's shelf, but such a result is hardly less strange than those cases where
the statute has been held to run before the injury occurs.
Another line of cases has held that the statute of limitations in warranty
runs from the time of the injury. The plaintiff in Rodibaugh v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co.18 lost the sight of one eye when he was struck by part of a
defective hinge from the front blade of a bulldozer manufactured by defendant and sold to plaintiff's employers. Although the sale occurred several
years before the action was begun, it was held that the cause of action did
not accrue until the date of the injury and plaintiff was able to recover in
spite of the one-year statute of limitations. An earlier California case carried
dicta to the same effect.'9
The most liberal rule as to when a cause of action for breach of warranty
accrues is the so-called "discovery" rule followed in Puretex Lemon Juice, Inc.
v. S. Riekes & Sons, Inc.- Defendant sold metal bottle caps to plaintiff on
November 10, 1956, which were used by plaintiff in bottling several thousand
jugs of lemon and lime juice. The caps deteriorated through rusting and
spoiled the juice. Plaintiff alleged that its first knowledge of the condition
came on November 1, 1957, when customers reported the defect. The action
was filed July 27, 1959, and was held to be within the applicable two-year
statute of limitations. The court made no attempt to ascertain the time of the
injury (spoiling of the juice) but instead ruled that the cause of action
accrued at the time the injury was discovered. While apparently no other
state has judicially adopted this view, 2' it was vigorously affirmed by Chief
Justice Desmond in a dissenting opinion 22 in the New York Court of Appeals.
15. Note that the UNiFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-725 (2) provides that "a breach of
warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made...." Tender by the manufacturer? To the
retailer? Or does it depend upon who is suing?
16. L. E. Talott & Sons, Inc. v. Aurora Corp., 181 F. Supp. 581 (D. Del.), aff'd, 280
F.2d 128 (3d CAr. 1960); Challis v. Harfloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199 (1933); Drooley v.
Collins, 281 App. Div. 733, 117 N.Y.S.2d 905 (1952); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sheila-Lynn,
Inc., 185 Misc. 689, 57 N.Y.S.2d 707 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd, 270 App. Div. 835, 61 N.Y.S.2d
373, motion for leave to appeal denied, 270 App. Div. 893, 62 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1946). See also
Natale v. Upjohn CO., 236 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D. Del. 1964) where the court alludes to this
problem after the attorneys failed to raise it.
17. See Creviston v. General Motors Corp., 210 So. 2d 755 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
18. 225 Cal. App. 2d 570, 37 Cal. Rptr. 646 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
19. Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 266 P-.d 163 (Dist. Ct. App.
1954).
20. 351 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961).
21. For opinions specifically rejecting the time of discovery rule see Rubino v. Utah
Canning CO., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 266 P.2d 163 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Schwartz v. Heyden
Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, 4 A.L.R.3d 814
(1963).
22. Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237
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In that case umbrathor had been inserted in the plaintiff's sinuses in 1944
to make them perceptible in X-ray photographs. The drug allegedly caused a
cancerous condition requiring removal of the plaintiff's eye in 1957. The
action was commenced in 1959. The trial court dismissed it as barred by the
applicable three-year statute of limitations and the court of appeals affirmed,
holding that the statute ran from the date of the sale. In his dissenting
opinion Desmond noted: "[From] his brief and his oral argument.., it seems
that [plaintiff's] theory of action is that the carcinogenic qualities of the
injection were not discoverable by him until after the 1957 surgical operation.
If that be the fact, it would be unreasonable and perhaps unconstitutional
to hold that his time to sue expired before it was possible for him to learn
23
of the wrong."
Florida courts have recently adopted the time-of-sale rule. In Creviston v.
General Motors Corp. the petitioner presented the court with the question: 24
Whether a cause of action for personal injuries [based upon breach of
implied warranty of merchantibility] accrued when a refrigerator was
purchased or whether it accrued when a latent defect in the refrigerator inflicted personal injuries on the purchaser.
Plaintiff had purchased the refrigerator in February 1962; the accident and
resulting injury occurred in December 1966. The complaint was filed in
April 1967. Considering the matter as one of first impression in Florida, the
district court held the action barred by the three-year statute of limitations
for implied contract in Florida Statutes, section 95.11 (5) (c) .25 This result,
if not correct, at least is in accord with the great weight of authority.2 6 However, in Florida the wrongful death statute27 includes a provision for actions
ex contractu and the two-year statute of limitations for this action does not
begin to run until the date of death.28 Based upon these statutes it would
seem that the wrongful death action arising from a breach of warranty could
be brought within two years of death regardless of the period that had run
since the actual sale of the goods. 29
A statement of the law of warranty limitations periods would not be
complete without some mention of the doctrine of "future performance."
N.Y.S.2d 714, 4 A.L.R.3d 814 (1963).
23. Id. at 219, 188 N.E.2d at 146, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 719, 4 A.L.R.3d at 820.
24. 210 So. 2d 755 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968) involved a pre-Code transaction.
25.

The court cited Ricciuti v. Voltarc Tubes, Inc., 277 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1960); Schwartz

v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, 4
A.L.RI.3d 814 (1963); Kakargo v. Grange Silo Co., 11 App. Div. 2d 796, 204 N.Y.S.2d 1010,

motion for leave to appeal denied, 11 App. Div. 2d 958, 207 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1960).
26. See also cases cited supra note 11.
27. FLA. STAT. §768.01 (2) (1967).

28. FLA. STAT. §95.11 (6) (1967) interpreting St. Francis Hospital v. Thompson, 159 Fla.
543, 31 So. 2d 710 (1947).
29. See Parker v. City of Jacksonville, 82 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1955). That case involved
FLA. STAT. §95.24 (1967), which required that actions against a city for negligent or wrongful
injury to person or property be commenced within one year from the time of injury. Since
the action was for wrongful death, the court disregarded the above statute and applied the
two-year limitation period set out in FLA. STAT. §95.11 (6) (1967).
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If a warranty extends to the future performance of a product (that it will
perform at or until some particular time) the cause of action does not accrue
until the product fails to perform. This exception to the normal accrual
rules has been construed rather strictly. In Citizen's Utilities Co. v. American

Locomotive Co., for example, it was held a warranty that generators "[W]ere
so designed and constructed that with normal operation they would last 30
years.... ,,.0 was merely a warranty of present characteristics and that the
statute of limitations ran out six years after the sale. The implied warranties
in sections 2-314 and 2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code although somewhat ambiguous in this regard 3' apparently do not extend to the future performance of goods. 32 Nevertheless, the doctrine has been incorporated into
the Uniform Commercial Code33 and has been applied in both Code"4 and
non-Code35 cases involving express warranties.
Much of the foregoing discussion has been based upon pre-Code or nonCode cases. Although the statute of limitations in section 2-725 of the Code
applies only to contracts for the sale of goods,3 6 the section adopts quite dearly
the majority view that a warranty action occrues at the time of sale:3 7
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued....
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless
of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of
warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made. . ..

In Rufo v. Bastian-BlessingCo.,38 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied
this section literally to a case involving personal injuries. Defendant, Bastian
Blessing Co., manufactured a valve used on liquified gas cylinders. Plaintiff
purchased such a cylinder in March 1956, and in December 1957 gas escaped
from the valve resulting in an explosion and fire. The court ruled that
plaintiff's complaint, filed July 1960, was not within the four-year period
30. 11 N.Y.2d 409, 184 N.E.2d 171, 230 N.Y.S2d 194 (1962). See also Matlack, Inc. v.
Butler Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 972 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
31. UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE §2-314 (l) specifies a warranty that the goods "shall be
merchantable" (emphasis added). Section 2-315 provides that "there is . . . an implied
warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose." (emphasis added).
32. Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 417 Pa. 107, 207 A.2d 823 (1965).
33. UNIFORM CoMME. crAL CODE §2-725(2) provides in part: "A breach of warranty
occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly entends to
future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of
such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been
discovered."
34. Perry v. Augustine, 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 416 (County Ct. C.P.), 3 UCC REP. SEmv. 735
(1935); Hempfield v. Teetum, 47 Westmoreland County L.J. 241 (County Ct. C.P. 1964),
2 UCC REP. SEtv. 518 (1965).

35. John S. Sills & Sons, Inc. v. Bridgetown Condensed Milk Co., 43 F.2d 72 (3d Cir.
1980); Southern Cal. Enterprises v. D.N. & E. Walter & Co., 78 Cal. App. 2d 750, 178 P.2d
785 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947); Woodworth v. Rice Bros. Co., 193 App. Div. 971, 184 N.Y.S. 958
(1920), aff'd, 233 N.Y. 577, 135 N.E. 925 (1922).
36.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-106 (1).

37.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-275.
38. 417 Pa. 107, 207 A.2d 823 (1965).
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and that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. There is no
indication in the opinion, and no reason to suppose, that the result would
be any different if the explosion had taken place in April 1960 and the
complaint had been filed immediately thereafter. Thus, the pre-Code decision
of Kakargo v. Grange Silo Co.39 that a cause of action for breach of warranty
accrues at the time of sale is still the majority rule today. The Uniform Commercial Code, section 2-725 (2), acknowledges it and only two states have
refused to adopt the above section. Alabama has legislatively adopted the
time of injury rule, 40

South Carolina, the time of discovery rule.41 It is

therefore a fair generalization to say that a buyer's cause of action for breach
of warranty accrues no later than the time of sale.
TOWARD A MoRE EQUITABLE ADJUSTMENT

OF INTERESTS

The harshness of a statute of limitations that can run out before the
plaintiff is injured or perhaps even before he purchases the defective product
is apparent, and courts are not wholly unmindful of what they are doing.
Certainly, the argument goes, injustices are done to a few plaintiff's but the
harm is outweighed by that which would be done defendants if claims could
be brought five, or even twenty years after the defendant sold the product.
Society's interest in repose has generally been stated in terms of two
problems: first, the further in time you get from a disputed event the more
difficult it becomes to prove what really happened, thus increasing the probability of incorrect decisions; second, in fairness, businessmen can only be
expected to preserve their records for a limited time and, the argument
continues, once they destroy their records they become highly vulnerable
to spurious actions. With regard to the second point, the Comment to Uniform Commercial Code, section 2-725, indicates that four years was chosen
as the limitation period because it was ".

record keeping period.- 4 2
separately.

.

. within the normal commercial

Each of these problems will be considered

Time Elapsed Since the Disputed Event
Certainly the amount and reliability of evidence that will be submitted at
trial diminishes with the passage of time, and if the legislature says that four
years of diminution is enough, it is difficult to quarrel with that opinion.
But that is not what they have said. Statutes of limitations do not run from
the time the evidence comes into existence, they run from the time the
39. 11 App. Div. 2d 796, 204 N.Y.S.2d 1010, motion for leave to appeal denied, 11 App.
Div. 2d 958, 207 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1960).
40. At the end of subsection two the Alabama statute adds "...
however, a cause of
action for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods shall accrue when the injury
occurs." ALA. CODE. tit. 7A, §2-725 (1965).
41. The South Carolina version of subsection two provides: "A cause of action accrues
for breach of warranty when the breach is or should have been discovered." S.C. CODE ANN.
§10.2-725 (2) (1962).
42. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-725, Comment.
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cause of action comes into existence. In most cases the two happen at about
the same time, but not so with breach of warranty. The "disputed event"
in a warranty case is most often either the injury or the occurrence of the
defect in the thing sold. Evidence of the defective condition would normally
come into existence either at the time of injury (through an examination of
the thing itself) or at the time of manufacture (faulty design, unwholesome
ingredients). Neither of these bear any necessary relationship to the time of
the sale. Evidence of the sale itself, of course, arises at the time of sale, but
seldom is the sale itself seriously disputed. What the legislature has done is
to pick a largely arbitrary point from which to run the statute and in so
doing they have built a more than necessary amount of unfairness into it.
The Business Records Keeping Period
Regardless of the logic with which the limitations periods were set up
there would still be considerable utility to a system that allowed a businessman to dispose of his records after four years. But the Uniform Commercial
Code statute and the Kakargo rule do no such thing. If we assume, in
accordance with the majority view, that the statute runs from the date of
sale to the consumer, a manufacturer would not be safe in disposing of his
records until four years from the date of that sale. Clearly the manufacturer
can never be sure just when that date has passed since some retailers may still
have the produce in stock long after manufacture has ceased. Wholesalers
would face a similar problem. Moreover, with the advent of section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts whereby a manufacturer can be held
liable not only to the vendor, but to the ultimate consumer, any security the
43
manufacturer may have had in disposing of his records has surely been lost.
In addition, the argument that merchants will dispose of records of the
sale can have no application in the vast majority of cases, since either these
records are not kept at all or they are filed in such away that they cannot
be found in the event of litigation. It is only for relatively expensive goods
that a retailer or wholesaler would keep records indexed by the customer's
name or the product sold.
What is suggested is that the statute of limitations for a personal injury
action based on breach of warranty run from the time when the injury is,
or should have been, discovered. Admittedly, this approach is somewhat
lacking in legal symmetry since, as the court in Creviston v. General Motors
Corp. pointed out:An implied warranty [action] is an action founded on contract not in
writing and normally on actions on contracts the limitations usually
43. The limitation period on a §402A action runs from the time of the injury.
v. New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968). While there is no published
specifically adopting §402A in Florida, as a practical matter it would seem to
much in effect, McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965); Royal v.
Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d 307 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
44. 210 So. 2d 755, 757 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
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commence to run when the cause of action accrues. Generally the time
of the breach of the agreement and not the date of actual damages
sustained commences the breach.
The draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code clearly employed the same
logic in section 2-725.
It has been argued in reply that the personal injury action for breach of
implied warranty is not ex contractu, but rather sounds in tort, 45 and the
argument is not without some authority to support it.46 But so important a
question as when the statute of limitations begins to run should not turn
upon such legal niceties. In considering the argument that a cause of action
for negligence under the Federal Employer's Liability Act accrued when the
injury occurred (since that was the last element necessary to the cause of
action) the United States Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff could not
have discovered his cause of action until a considerable time after the injury
4
and then stated: 7
We do not think the humane legislative plan intended such consequences to attach to blameless ignorance. Nor do we think that those
consequences can be reconciled with the traditional purposes of statutes
of limitations, which conventionally require the assertion of claims
within a specified period of time after notice of the invasion of legal
rights. The record before us is clear that Urie became too ill to work
in May of 1940 and that diagnosis of his condition was accomplished
in the following weeks. There is no suggestion that Urie should have
known he had silicosis at any earlier date.
This pragmatic approach to the problem of the plaintiff who learns of his
injury too late was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Florida in City of
48
Miami v. Brooks:
The general rule, of course, is that where an injury, although slight, is
sustained in consequence of the wrongful act of another, and the law
affords a remedy therefor, the statute of limitations attaches at once.
...There is a distinction, however, between notice of the negligent
act and notice of its consequences.
The court went on to hold that the cause of action did not accrue until the
49
plaintiff had notice of the negligent act, then stated:

45. Note, Effect of Statutes of Limitation on Implied Warranty Actions, 5 WASHBURN
L.J. 62 (1965).
46. Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d
592 (1963); Singer v. Walker, 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (Sup. Ct. 1964), aff'd,
15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965). A federal
court, applying Florida law, rejected the argument, Public Adm'r v. Curtis-Wright Corp.,
224 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
47. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949).
48. 70 So. 2d 306, 308 (Fla. 1954).
49. Id. at 309.
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To hold otherwise, under circumstances of this kind, would indeed be
a harsh rule and prevent relief to an injured party who was without
notice during the statutory period of any negligent act that might
cause injury.
These arguments would seem to apply with equal force to the warranty
action and to call for an application of the discovery rule, but with the
exception of Puretex the courts have not yet done so.
In some cases application of the discovery rule may mean that the
disputed events will have taken place a considerable time before filing of the
lawsuit, but it must be remembered that the burden of proof on the issues
of defect and sale are on the plaintiff. In those cases where the evidence is
aged and somewhat questionable the trier of fact is still free to disbelieve it.
Certainly a judge or jury can be more discriminating than a statute that
determines the persuasiveness of the evidence by counting days. The advantage
of the discovery rule is that it gives the plaintiff a fair chance to bring his
lawsuit before time runs out. And this advantage is achieved without any
substantial detriment to the legitimate interest of defendants, which is not
to have a plaintiff deliberately delay his lawsuit in the hope that his evidence
will improve with age.
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